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Protecting Nation States and National
Minorities: A Modest Case for Nationalism in
Eastern Europe
Andras Sajot
The greatest adversary of the rights of nationality is the
modern theory of nationality. By making the State and the
nation commensurate with each other in theory, it reduces
practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that
may be within the boundary. It cannot admit them to an
equality with the ruling nation which constitutes the State,
because the State would then cease to be national... '
I. INTRODUCTION: THE EMERGENCE AND IMPORTANCE OF
NATIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE
2
This paper examines some of the problems of constitutional
protection for national minorities in post-communist Eastern Eu-
rope. It argues that nationalism is an inevitable factor in the
creation of the post-communist state. Post-communist states
cannot escape becoming nation-states because the community
and homogeneity necessary for the functioning of a state will be
based on ethnic community. This paper will show that such de-
velopments are inevitable, and that nationalist elements must be
considered when shaping constitutional arrangements and de-
mocracy in these countries. Only through recognition can nation-
* Chair, Constitutional and Legislative Policy Institute, The Central European
University (Budapest/Prague). The author wishes to express his gratitude to Rachel
Gibbons, Susan Moss and Nicole Reid for their assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1 Lord Acton, Essays in the Liberal Interpretation of History: Selected Papers 157
(Chicago, 1967).
2 Except as otherwise stated, "Eastern Europe" includes most of the former Europe-
an part of the Soviet Union (Russia, the Baltic states, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldava) and
the European satellites of the Soviet Union (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hunga-
ry, Romania, Bulgaria) as well as Albania and the republics of the former Yugoslavia
(Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia).
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alism be domesticated. However, in most post-communist states
the presence of national minorities is still significant. Except in
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Albania, the presence
of national minorities varies between 10 and 55 per cent. Thus,
recognizing the needs and sensitivities of nationalism leads to a
more reflexive and more realistic system for the protection of
national minorities.
A. Functions of Nationalism in Nation-state Building
Reading the Western press, one gets the impression that
Westerners view East European nation-state building with con-
tempt. They believe that history dominated by nationalism is
illustrated in the best case scenario by the 1870 German-French
War and in the worst case scenario by the gas chambers of
Auschwitz. Western critics must remember that nationalists are
only beginning to make history in Eastern Europe. The undeni-
able irrationality and bloody xenophobia of nationalist politicians
obscure the positive functions nationalism can and does play in
the region.4 For example, nationalism builds nation-states even
while it excludes minorities. West Europeans, accustomed to
assimilationist nationalism, reject the virulent strains of East
European nationalism.5 Assimilationist nationalism allows non-
' Hungary and Albania have no sizeable minorities (although Gypsies present
serious social problems). Hungarians (in Slovakia and Romania) and Albanian minorities
(in Kosovo-Serbia and in Macedonia) make the nationalities issue extremely important for
these countries.
' Nationalism and nation-building cannot be discussed simply in metaphoric terms
such as "virus" or idola tribum. For a criticism of similar approaches see Paula Franklin
Lytle, U.S. Policy Toward the Demise of Yugoslavia: The "Virus of Nationalism", 6 E Eur
Pol & Societies 303 (1992). Lytle aptly describes the terrible consequences of the meta-
phoric approach of the contemptuous Western foreign policies toward Yugoslavia and her
successor states.
' European nationalism seems irrational to Americans because assimilation by direct
state intervention and initiative runs contrary to the American values of tolerance and
minimal government. The difference between American constitutional nationalism and
European romantic ("blood and soil") nationalism is evidenced by comparing their con-
trasting oaths of allegiance. In America, citizens pledge allegiance to the Constitution
whereas in Eastern Europe, citizens pledge allegiance to the Nation, to territorial integri-
ty and to the Constitution, in varying order depending upon the country. For example,
"[t]o obtain naturalization, an alien does not pledge allegiance to the American people or
to the land mass of the United States. Rather, she must promise to "support and defend
the Constitution." T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitu-
tion, 7 Const Comm 9, 13 (1990). The Polish President, on the other hand, solemnly
swears in his oath of office not only to remain faithful to the Constitution, but also "to
firmly guard the dignity of the Nation, the independence and security of the State....
Polish Small Const, Art 31. Similar allegiance to the people and to territorial integrity is
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national citizens to share the national community under the
condition that they give up their own national culture, language,
and customs. Virulent nationalism, on the other hand, fears as-
similation because the 'aliens' will corrupt the virtue of the na-
tion. Therefore they are inclined to expel the aliens (commonly
known as "ethnic cleansing").
Nation-state building is still necessary even in today's world,
which is allegedly moving toward supranational formations.
Western Europe is not yet ready to assimilate East Central Eu-
rope.' Constitution-making and constitutionalism in Eastern
Europe should be understood as part of nation-state building. A
constitution, after all, is vital to the modern state: a nation must
have a constitution to control and limit the state's power. His-
torically, constitutions do not curtail the state's sovereign nature;
on the contrary, they affirm and protect the state's sovereignty.
The problem with nationalism is that certain virulent strains
pose a threat to modern constitutionalism because they do not re-
spect any restraints on sovereignty.
Most research on East European politics and constitutional
development ignores nationalism as a modernizing element in
history. The French nationalism of 1789 and the liberalism of the
first half of the 19th century advocated "universal" rights at a
time when countries often brutally repressed or denied the indi-
viduality of national minorities.' Although conditions today-are
fundamentally different from those of the 19th century, this new
nationalism may become increasingly mild if Western Europe
would willingly admit and integrate East European countries.
By excluding East European countries, Western Europe iso-
lates the entire region, not just the ardent nationalists. The forc-
es of nationalism may prevail while Eastern Europe waits for
admission into Europe. By constitutionalizing their "narrative,"
found in the oath of office taken by the Romanian President. Romanian Const, Y-Art 82.
Similarly, the French President "shall be the protector of the independence of the nation,
of the integrity of its territory." French Const, Art 5.
' "Whatever they now say, the architects and advocates of a unified Europe a la
Maastricht never wanted to include a whole group of have-not nations from the East ...."
Tony Judt, The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe, 121
Daedalus 4, 83, 110 (Fall 1992).
"It was in France .... with these gestures and none other that universal principles
were proclaimed, principles on which the Nation-a particular nation-was based. What
was abstract in those principles gave them a new lease on life: 'Here begins the country of
liberty.' The French nation with one effort amassed capital for two purposes: abstraction
and exportation." Pierre Nora, Nation, in Francois Furet and Mona Ozouf, eds, A Critical
Dictionary of the French Revolution 748 (Harvard, 1989).
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or vision, of nation, nationalists may affect society in the long
term by creating a xenophobic official sphere, which will in turn
create a xenophobic society.8
B. Nationalism in Eastern Europe
Nationalism has existed in Eastern Europe as an established
and influential ideology. Tradition played a major role in these
societies which were and to some extent still are "traditional," in
the sense that they are not fully governed by impersonal market
forces. In a society guided by tradition, economic and other trans-
actions are guided by inherited patterns. "Silent" nationalism
expressed in the form of customs such as the singing of forbidden
irredentist songs in private settings was the least risky way of
defying the oppressors. Nationalism also offered the simplest es-
cape for communist leaders at all levels and in all countries.
Those leaders emerged as "heroes" of post-last minute resistance
to Soviet oppression. For example, President Kravchouk of the
Ukraine originally ran against the nationalist candidates in the
first relatively free elections. He changed his views on Ukrainian
independence to some extent during the campaign. Presently, he
encourages the use of Ukrainian language in all official commu-
nications.
Nationalism is already a prominent presence in Eastern
Europe. Democracy and constitutionalism, on the other hand, lag
far behind in modern development and a market economy simply
does not exist. Nevertheless, all conditions being equal, the reli-
ance on nationalism in the transition to democracy is inevitable
because there is no other organizing idea. Under specific condi-
tions, nationalism may allow further democratization. After all,
nationalism played an important role in the collapse of commu-
nism. Helene Carrere D'Encausse argued that
' The views of virulent nationalists are quite contrary to those of assimilationist
nationalists. Virulent nationalists consider assimilation a predominantly Jewish "trick"
used to obtain political control and to corrupt the moral values and genetic "purity" of the
nation. Virulent nationalists reject assimilation, although they frequently propose "segre-
gated identity" as a possibility. Gypsies, for example, would be entitled to fully develop
their minority identity and culture as long as they stay within their ghettos, which the
state euphemistically refers to as "settlements." Virulent nationalists often deny citi-
zenship based upon an individual's ethnic origins. See, for example, Vladimir Tismaneanu
and Mircea Mihaies, Infamy Restored. Nationalism in Romania, E Eur Rptr 1, 25 (Jail
1992); Cynthia Kaplan, Estonia: A plural society on the road to independence in Ian
Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds, Nations & Politics in the Soviet Successor States 214-15
(Cambridge, 1993).
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The Nation, which Lenin thought he had exorcised, has
returned; it is wreaking vengeance for being ignored. It has
proved this by destroying communism, for its collapse came
about through the rebellion of the nations.9
The collapse of communism followed divergent paths in the
various East European countries. There are few ways to build so-
cialism, but there are many ways to dismantle it. Even if one
views nationalism as the principal political force that emerged to
fill the vacuum created by the communist collapse, or that na-
tionalism represents the survival of core elements of the previous
regime (statism, authoritarianism, and privilege), its importance
is undeniable.
Specific historical circumstances illustrate the power of na-
tionalism. Nationalism was deeply ingrained in the region's cul-
ture and was an easily available resource. Jan Urban gives the
following psychological explanation:
[After communism] we are left with atomized societies which
do not believe in anything and which have no enemy to fear.
Generations of the past lived on hatred toward a great, un-
known enemy, but this enemy has vanished, along with the
fear. What has remained is the memory of the big hatred.
What has remained is the inability to search for and find
positive connections with those outside ourselves. There is a
disease called suspicion, xenophobia/nationalism." °
On the other hand, nationalism seemed to be the only legiti-
mation for the new leaders, both former communists and anti-
communists, because resistance to communism (i.e. to Soviet
rule) was primarily under the flag of nationalism. However, this
resistance was limited and in many countries only occasionally
visible.
Nevertheless, nationalism was the most useful mobilizing
ideology because it automatically guaranteed majority support
and therefore legitimated power in the first democratic electoral
processes." After the initial period of enthusiasm wears off,
more fundamental issues will play a crucial role in determining
9 Helene Carrere d'Encausse, The End of the Soviet Empire 270 (Basic Books, 1993).
10 Jan Urban, Nationalism as a Totalitarian Ideology, 58 Social Research 775, 776
(1991).
" As John Breuilly argued, one cannot have nationalist politics if all players are
simply nationalists. If all parties promise the same thing, there can be no competition.
John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State 380-84 (Chicago, 1985).
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people's choices. Full employment will become more attractive
than 24 hours of folk music on the radio or the reintroduction of'
"traditional values" in education. But for the time being, nation-
alism may become the predominant ideology because of its long
history, the lack of self confidence of post-communist "citizens,"
and its natural attractiveness as a popular political ideology due
to its simple, repetitive and concrete nature." As Jadwiga
Staniskis affirmed: "As long as the economic foundations for a
genuine civil society do not exist, the massive political mobiliza-
tion of the population is only possible along nationalist or funda-
mentalist lines."3
Of course, once a political elite gains control over the state,
the elite can control social institutions without acting and there-
by diminish the need for nationalism. The elite will then turn to
constitutionalism. On the other hand, the many actors who are
dissatisfied with the emerging arrangement will not hesitate to
rely on nationalist terms to mobilize against those in power. For
example, the opposition will insist that the genuine uncorrupted
masses carry out a new revolution against those in power who
betrayed the nation.
To summarize, post-communist societies face a most uncom-
fortable situation. East European countries are required to simul-
taneously accomplish tasks that other Western societies dealt
with one at a time. According to Claus Offe, these countries must
solve the territorial issue (i.e., create undisputed and economical-
ly feasible borders), design a working economic and property
order, and create a democracy." The first task is to build a na-
tion-state. Next, Eastern Europe must create a new economic
order through implementation of a market economy because it is
the most efficient model of economic organization, especially
under present world economic conditions. Finally, democracy
requires a "constitutionally tamed exercise of authority."15
The specific nationalist element present in the solution to the
territorial problem fundamentally impacts democracy and the
economy. It particularly affects constitutionalism, including the
12 Id at 344. Simple and repetitive ideologies are easier to accept for the politically
uneducated.
13 Claus Offe, Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple
Transition in East Central Europe, 58 Social Research 865, 876 (1991) (quoting Jadwiga
Staniskis, Dilemmata der Demokratie in Osteurope in R. Deppe et al, Demokratischer
Umbruch in Osteuropa 326 (Suhrkamp, 1991)).
" Offe, 58 Social Research at 872 (cited in note 13).
15 Id.
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protection of national minorities. 6 Social transformation cannot
be understood without looking at the ongoing state-building by
nationalist forces.
Under communism, the state was the strongest social organi-
zation and the exclusive provider of social services. The state also
employed an incredible army of bureaucrats. Because of the lega-
cy of communist etatism, East Etiropean constitutions are cur-
rently being written for states that possess tremendous power
resulting from their control over property and services and the
lack of institutional or individual initiatives to limit such power.
The nationalist desires a strong state because only a strong state
can protect the new country against its imaginary enemies, and
only in a strong state will his power match that of his communist
predecessors.
Drafting a constitution in nationalist terms could lead to
denial of separation of powers and limitations on fundamental
civil and political rights." These limitations stem from the belief
held by most nationalists that the Nation is in danger and that
the state savior needs emergency powers to preserve it. Elster
hypothesizes that a major obstacle to constitutionalism is that
"[t]he future of so many Eastern European countries may prove
to be a succession of such emergencies, in which constitutional
self-binding might be disastrous." 8 If declaring various states of
emergencies becomes a routine matter, then the limits on power
that emerge in the constitutional system will be dysfunctional.
Complicated mechanisms of a political system based on self-con-
straint may delay decision-making and therefore emergencies
will be handled inefficiently.
18 The nation-state seems to be a historical and logical necessity for new democracies.
Breuilly, Nationalism and the State at 349 (cited in note 11). The fact that constitutions
are often written at the climax of nationalist influence may seriously impact
constitutionalism. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
1 The nationalist exaltation of sovereignty as a necessary means against the "enemy"
inevitably recalls the ideas of Carl Schmitt. See generally, Joseph W. Beudersky, Carl
Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich (Princeton, 1983). Schmitt's advocacy of unlimited power
concentrated in the hands of the Fiihrer may well become the future point of orientation
for East European theoreticians and practitioners of despotism. Paul Edward Gottfried,
Carl Schmitt: Politics and Theory 1-5 (Greenwood, 1990) (discussing renewed popularity of
Schmitt's ideas among European intellectuals).
" Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, 58 U Chi L Rev 447, 482 (1991).
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II. POSTCOLONIAL STATES IN EASTERN EUROPE
In many respects, emerging East European countries are
post-colonial states in the process of nation-building. To some
extent, all communist countries existed in a colonial system. The
Soviet Union was a colonial power, the only one to turn its own
heartland, Russia, into its colony. Russians were denied their
national culture and identity just like other peoples.19 The satel-
lite states maintained their formal independence, sometimes
within "unnatural" boundaries. Although people in a satellite
state may have felt as though they were living in an occupied
country, it is more proper to describe the situation as a "colony."
The system was not based on daily intimidation by a foreign
military presence. Instead, order was maintained by local police
and by the understandable opportunism of the "natives" who
avoided open resistance and tried to make use of the system as it
existed.
Whatever future attends the post-communist state,
... let us also remember that the nation-state is, for better
or worse, the political institution which has most efficacy
and legitimacy in the world as it is. Modernity reproduces
itself in nation-states, there are few signs of it happening
otherwise. To reject nationalism absolutely or to refuse to
discriminate between nationalisms is to accede to a way of
thought by which intellectuals-especially postcolonial intel-
lectuals-cut themselves off from effective political action.2"
The key term in this quotation is "post-colonial."21 The post-colo-
nial nature of the East European nationalists and state-builders
is evidenced in their constitutions and constitutional politics.
" See Carrere d'Encausse, The End of the Soviet Empire at 177 (cited in note 9).
20 Simon During, Literature-Nationalism's Other? The case for Revision, in Homi K_
Bhabha, ed, Nation and Narration 139 (Routledge, 1990).
2 Analysts of post-communist states are often inclined to look at transitions to de-
mocracy in Spain, Portugal and sometimes Latin America. See, for example, Bruce
Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution 38, 47, 119 (Yale, 1992). Spain has historical-
ly been a constant point of reference for Hungary, although not for nationalists who voted
against the Monument of Conciliation. The closest parallel to Eastern Europe, however, is
not Spain but post-colonial Africa. Spain has been a model for Eastern Europe partly
because the Spanish transition took place peacefully after a long dictatorship in a less
developed country and resulted in successful economic integration into Western Europe.
The post-colonial African experience is a more accurate parallel for Eastern Europe
(especially the former Soviet Union), because in Africa as well as in Eastern Europe there
was no homogeneous nation state and no national bourgeois class. For both countries, the
chances of integration in the first world economy are dim.
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Contrary to the thinking in Eastern Europe, the process of
drafting a Constitution in countries converting to democracy is
not a form of nation-state building. For example, the Spanish
constitution, which was considered at the Hungarian Round-
Table Talks of 1989 and in the daily press to be a model of tran-
sition to democracy in Europe, denied autonomy to Catalonians,
Basques, and many smaller minorities. The integration of Spain
into Western Europe and the diminishing importance of national-
ism for the Spanish majority under stable socio-economic condi-
tions allowed the national minority situation to "normalize"; that
is, to create a system of rights which enables the minorities to
maintain a sufficient level of autonomy."
In addition to the problems of converting to democracy'
and ordinary nationalism, these countries face the burden of
emerging from the diffuse empire of the Soviet Union. This dif-
fuse empire created a special problem for national identity
building. In the Soviet Union, Stalin deliberately mixed ethnic
groups by forced mass relocation (e.g. Tartars and Volga Ger-
mans), resettlement by Russians (in the Baltics and in
Kazakhstan) and the addition of new territories to previously
ethnically homogeneous republics which were populated by other
ethnic groups.' The possible consequences of such mixture were
known already in the 19th century:
Nothing seems more obviously opposed to the purposes of
government than the unnatural enlargement of states, the
wild mixing together of different human species and nations
under one scepter."'
Unfortunately this "wild mixing" still persists. Stalin's nationali-
ty policy is the oldest of his surviving achievements.
In other countries, "wild mixing" took place much earlier in
history. Serbs were settled in the Krajina by the Habsburgs in
the 18th century. Hungarian szeklers were sent to defend the
' See Davydd J. Greenwood, Castilians, Basques, and Andalusians: An Historical
Comparison of Nationalism, "True" Ethnicity, and 'False" Ethnicity, in Paul Brass, ed,
Ethnic Groups and the State 204, 214-15 (Barnes and Noble, 1985).
' See Samuel P. Huntington, How Countries Democratize, 106 Pol Science Q 579
(1992).
2 Victor Zaslavsky, Success and Collapse : Traditional Soviet Nationality Policy in
Bremmer and Taras, eds, Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States at 33 (cited
in 8).
' Breuilly, Nationalism and the State at 339 (quoting Johann Gottfried Herder)
(cited in note 11).
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medieval Hungarian borders several hundred years ago. Ger-
mans and Jews periodically relocated-sometimes forcefully,
sometimes voluntarily-to all areas in the region during the last
eight hundred years.
Nationalists asserted their independence in nationalist
terms. Nationalism in this respect was neither a pure denial of
pragmatism nor a pure rebirth of ethnocentrism. According to
John Breuilly, this kind of nationalism is a form of politics, a way
of mobilizing to achieve control over state power.26 Nationalism
in Eastern Europe is both state-creating and state-controlling
because it uses politics to obtain and maintain control over the
state. Examples of this include the political development of
Slovakia, the post-Yugoslav state, Byelorussia, Georgia, and the
Ukraine.
Secession as dictated by nationalism may lead the way out of
the irrationality institutionalized by the Soviet Empire. Commu-
nist domination was based on irrationality since only individual
initiative and economic efficiency could guarantee the mainte-
nance of power of the Communist Party leaders. However, the
existence of a national minority or a "different" group can arouse
suspicion in people whose identity is based on a history of suffer-
ing. Minorities and even the majority may reasonably choose to
opt out of this nightmare. Breaking the old "unions" and creating
a new nation-state is the rational choice when no nation, republic
or country can tell whether it is a loser or a winner in the com-
plicated and arbitrary system of exchanges. The Soviet Empire
destroyed the trust among nations such that it was perhaps easi-
er to build new relations between new autonomous nations from
the ground up.
Nationalism as a means of state building and achieving polit-
ical power impacts the constitutional politics regarding minori-
ties. For example, some of the new East European states de-
clared the majority language as the official language without
granting clear language-use rights to minorities." Also, during
the period of constitution-making, the Baltic states denied or
restricted citizenship to "alien residents."'
26 Id at 300-01.
27 Language-use rights include the right to use one's native language in public
communications, including education, and the right to petition the authorities in that
language. Sometimes authorities are expected to answer such requests in the language of
the minority. See Note, The Protection of Language Rights in International Human Rights
Law: A Proposed Draft Declaration of Linguistic Rights 32 Va J Intl L 515, 516, 563
(1992).
Estonia granted citizenship to domiciled non-Estonian residents. Those who were
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Although they may be inevitable in the early stages of state-
building, all these developments may result in or at least per-
petuate traditionalism based on state-dictated communal values
and denial of individuality. Exclusion of certain ethnic groups or
at least denial of their autonomous identity may follow such a
concept of statehood. A nation-state is a combination of a kind of
nationalist exclusion algorithm (a set of rules which automati-
cally determine who is to be excluded) and a state. However,
integration into or increased dependence on Europe (a movement
which is not yet widely accepted in constitutional interpretation
and everyday politics) may change the course of nationalism. The
strongly nationalist nation-state, which insists on the sanctity of
a nationally homogeneous state, is a functional though unfortu-
nate necessity in this part of the world. However, nationalism
may simply be indispensable when creating homogeneity, a social
characteristic which is considered essential to a modern constitu-
tional state.29
III. PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES OF PROTECTING NATIONAL
MINORITIES IN A NATIONALIST STATE
Understanding the emerging East European constitutions as
acts of post-colonial nation-state building does not mean that the
process justifies the denial of fundamental rights or the mistreat-
ment or neglect of minorities. Although no emerging constitution
accepts the idea of discrimination among citizens, some East
European states have denied citizenship to their minorities. In
Estonia and Latvia, the legal status of Russians is particularly
delicate. Granting citizenship to Russians is often considered a
concession to former oppressors and a recognition of communist-
Russian ethnic imperialism.
In a number of cases, states simultaneously deny residence
rights along with citizenship, and in the most extreme cases
ethnic cleansing occurs. If their citizenship is recognized, national
minorities are legally equal to their fellow citizens. However,
national minorities do not desire total assimilation.
residents at the time of the promulgation of the law received privileged treatment. Two
years residence from the entry into force is enough to qualify for citizenship. Practically,
however, the Russian residents were excluded from the decisive first elections and from
participation in constitution-making. Tammu Tammerk, Shaking off the Soviet Legacy, E
Eur Rptr 40, 41 (Jan 1992).
' Ulrich K. Preuss, The Politics of Constitution Making: Transfonning Politics into
Constitutions, 13 L & Policy 107, 119 (1991).
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A. National Identity-The Nationalist Concept Extended to
Minority Nations
In many respects equality for national minorities implies the
right to be different."0 This notion was recognized in interna-
tional law in the Paris peace treaties following World War I. In
an advisory opinion, the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice recognized that the treaties were designed to preserve the
characteristics of national and other minorities.3' In order to
attain this objective the Court found it necessary
[to ensure that nationals belonging to racial, religious or
linguistic minorities ... be placed in every respect on a
footing of perfect equality with the other nationals of the
State.... to ensure for the minority elements suitable
means for the preservation of their racial peculiarities, their
traditions and their national characteristics.32
Protection of national minority identities presents specific
problems in the current transition to democracy from commu-
nism. The national composition of East European countries and
of different territories within the countries is particularly difficult
to handle. Members of the national minorities often do not live in
discrete communities, rendering territorial autonomy impossible.
To further complicate matters, there are minorities within minor-
ities.33 Some East European national minorities have national
identity problems themselves.34
Tibor Varady, Collective Minority Rights and Problems in Their Legal Protection:
The Example of Yugoslavia, 6 E Eur Pol & Societies 260, 273 (1992).
" Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion of Apr 6, 1935, Series A/B n 64.
32 Id at 17.
' National "identity" is changing in the process of defining the positions of the vari-
ous national groups under the constitution. For an interesting analysis of the impact of
political conflict and negotiation on national identity, see Paul R. Brass, ed, Ethnic
Groups and the State (cited in note 22). For example, before the partition of India in 1947,
Hindus were a majority in the Punjab. However, the creation of a Punjabi Suba state in
Punjab pushed the Hindus into the minority position. Post-civil war Yugoslavia presents a
similar situation. See Varady, 6 E Eur Pol & Societies at 266 (cited in note 30).
' There is no common or standard language for the Gypsies. Similarly, the Germans
in Poland and Hungary have a serious identity crisis because most of them no longer
speak German. Conversely, despite their common heritage, Jews in Hungary disagree on
the desirability of assimilation and whether there is a need for protection as a national or
religious minority, or whether no special protection is the best way to achieve social
peace.
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B. East European Limits on Minority Identity
National minorities as social groups in many cases have
survived by maintaining their primordial, kinship-based struc-
tures (for example, Gypsies, and to a lesser extent, Tartars). In
these cases, allowing the national minority groups to develop
their cultural diversity may challenge the universal constitution-
al and human rights values embodied in the emerging constitu-
tions. In other cases, the possibility of multiculturalism is per-
ceived by the majority as a menace to its own core values. Some
cultural and social homogeneity is necessary for social order
within the state.35 Multiculturalism may endanger such a homo-
geneity, especially where society is rapidly disintegrating. Al-
though similar problems exist outside post-communist Eastern
Europe, three particularly important and unique features exist in
this region which make minority protection especially difficult:
1) The battles among the national groups are actually a
power struggle among the various former communist lead-
ers.
36
2) The State plays a prominent role in society because main-
taining the identity of the national minorities is nearly im-
possible without financial and other governmental support.
3) Most nationalist traditions in the region are strongly
xenophobic, a fact which has repeatedly resulted in attempts
to exterminate "other" national groups. Consequently, most
national groups have been threatened, including groups
which have held a majority position.
Although both majority and minority nationalism endanger
constitutionalism and even democracy, it would be wrong to
equate the two. Minority identity protection is not based on xeno-
phobic nationalism, while the opposite is true of majority nation-
' The antagonism between multiculturalism and universalism as represented by the
liberal individualism of Western constitutionalism is not limited to Eastern Europe. See
generally, Charles Taylor, The politics of recognition in Amy Guttmann, ed,
Multiculturalism and "The politics of recognition" 54-55 (Princeton, 1992).
' The federal republics of Russia are still under the leadership of former local party
bosses who seek greater autonomy from Moscow, which is ruled by their former commu-
nist bosses. In many respects the collapse of the Soviet Union is best understood as the
revolt of the local party leaders against the center. The Tatarstan Republic's attempt to
achieve independence through a local referendum later declared unconstitutional by the
Russian Constitutional Court is the best known case on this point. See Herman Schwartz,
The Newest Players in the Russian Power Game, LA Times M2 (May 2, 1993). Ironically,
the leaders of Tatarstan sought national identity by reference to the Tartar national
minority, deported to the region by Stalin.
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alism. However, unconditional support for minority rights may be
the equivalent of writing a blank check for visibly antidemocratic
forces and may equally endanger constitutionalism.
In addition to the dangers of nationalism and authoritarian-
ism, more general or theoretical caveats to be applied in granting
constitutional protection to national minorities exist. For exam-
ple, majority leaders fear that the national minority will do one
of two things: either capture the majority position, or secede in
order to create a new state by itself or to unite with another
state where its group is the national majority. These fears are
often shared by individual nationalists and political elites who
claim to represent the interests of the majority.
The first fear is rooted in the notion that the majority may
create a new national minority problem by granting autonomy to
a national minority. The minority identity will dominate in spe-
cific circumstances of minority self-government: the language of
the minority will become the "official language" and the minority
will control the decision-making body in which it holds the major-
ity.37 Consequently, members of the majority may themselves
become minorities and will require protection against the local
majority.38
The second fear concerning minority secession often moti-
vates the denial of special rights for national minorities under
the pretext of formal equality among all citizens. However, this
concern does not form the basis for all denials of special rights to
minorities. Sometimes such denials are rooted in the lack of a
clear consensus that minorities (either collectively or individual-
ly) deserve special protection.
In many cases, even ostensibly "neutral" nation-states that
enforce human rights policies engage in practices which endanger
"' The situation in Quebec is perhaps the most commonly cited example of this
premise. See Michael R. Hudson, Multiculturalism, Government Policy and Constitutional
Enshrinement-A Comparative Study in Canadian Human Rights Foundation, ed,
Multiculturalism and the Charter 82 (Carswell, 1987).
' For example, The typical Russian nationalist criticizes Gorbachev and Yeltsin for
sacrificing the Russians living in the Baltic states when they allowed the region to become
independent. See John Dunlop, Russia: Confronting loss of empire in Bremmer and Taras,
eds, Nations & Politics in the Soviet Successor States at 47-48, 66 (cited in note 8). Simi-
larly, in 1868, the Hungarian political elite denied autonomy to the national minorities in
the Austro-Hungarian Empire out of fear that Hungarians would become minorities in
any new autonomous regions. Ironically, after the Romanian territories joined Romania
after World War I, the Hungarian minority in those territories did in fact become victims
of the Romanian majority. See Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into
the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism 162-63, 169 (Westview, 1977).
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the national minority's identity. Constitutionally protected "uni-
versal" values shared by the majority may contradict the practic-
es and values that shape the national minority's identity. The
practice of female circumcision by certain minorities is a dramat-
ic illustration of this point.39 In other cases, the interests of na-
tional minorities may clash, making minority protection difficult.
Of course, it is exactly in these situations that constitutionalism
may play a crucial role by limiting the power of majority rule.
C. Special Protection for National Minorities?
From a universalist-Kantian perspective, both national ma-
jority and national minority identities are constitutionally pro-
tected as long as they do not limit the other group's identity or
interfere with individual autonomy. On the other hand, efforts by
national minorities to protect their unique identities and tradi-
"tions are not attempts to garner special treatment and should be
respected.
National minorities may deserve special treatment as poten-
tial and actual victims of majority oppression, but considerations
of equality do not always transform easily into rights. National
minority leaders prefer to use the absolutist language of minority
and human rights in order to establish a position within the
state that cannot be negotiated away. The absolutist language
requires that rights be conceived as unconditionally given pre-
cepts, binding on all states. This preference for rights language is
shared by like-minded post-Enlightenment nationalist
ideologists.40
Construing national minority rights, or, rights to a national
identity, as human rights instead of as a derivative of individual
rights, forces the State to balance the practice of protecting mi-
nority rights with protecting other equally important human
' England has banned the practice and specifically excludes national minority
custom from a list of exemptions. This treatment was criticized for suppressing minority
particularity. Sebastian M. Poulter, English Law and Ethnic Minority Customs 154-59
(Butterworths, 1986). For views supporting the acceptance of ethnic (national) minority
customs in a different legal culture, see id at 40, 258-59, 278-81 (discussing the customs of
dowry, dress, and slaughtering of animals).
40 Accepting the rights language of nationalists would be a strange concession to the
Zeitgeist which is dominated by human rights ideology. On the other hand, the universal
nature of human rights may have a tranquilizing effect on nationalism. However, the
strong emphasis on the collective or group nature of national minority rights reflects the
nationalist tradition's resistance to modernism which may counter this tranquilizing
effect. The universalist right to a national identity may create a "special zone" where
universal human rights do not apply.
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rights. State constitutions could then limit minority rights, if at
all, only for the same reasons that other rights are limited, like
for reasons of public order.
The human rights-based approach discusses minority inter-
ests and needs in terms of absolute rights. Once national minori-
ty rights become protected as human rights, justifications for
claims of minority protection are no longer necessary. However,
this may pose political and intellectual disadvantages. The na-
tion-state may view unconditional claims of minorities as a men-
ace to its integrity. The intellectual disadvantage 41 is that most,
if not all, the rights claimed as national minority rights are al-
ready granted as "universal" human rights, which are not group
rights.
Human beings have the right to associate, to travel, to re-
ceive an education, and to not be subject to discrimination.42
Whenever national minority protection is taken seriously, the
granting of otherwise existing rights to minorities may go well
beyond the simple "equal enjoyment" of these rights. The right to
national minority identity, however, requires additional protec-
tion of the fundamental rights of minorities or minority members.
For example, a national minority's claim to the right to use its
own language is certainly not satisfied by being required to use
the official language, even if this is not the language of the ma-
jority (as is the case with English in India).
The use of "discrimination" or differentiation to equalize
differences may still fit into the Aristotelian concept of "equality
as justice." Justice demands that only identical or similar groups
receive similar, or equal, treatment, while different groups may
be entitled to different treatment. National majorities and politi-
cians concerned about the unity of the state deny the relevance of
such differences.
If minority needs are expressed in terms of rights, inequality
rapidly develops, especially when minority needs have budgetary
consequences. Granting these rights may require related services,
elevating the per capita expenditure for minorities to a level
41 Further problems, such as defining minority and collective or group rights, are not
discussed in this paper. For further references, see Patrick Thornberry, International Law
and the Rights of Minorities 57, 141, 257 (Clarendon, 1991); Malcolm N. Shaw, The Defi-
nition of Minorities in International Law, 20 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 13 (1990).
42 Non-democratic, repressive regimes viewed minority rights, including the right to
receive and host conational foreign visitors at home and the right to travel to maintain an
ethnic identity, as privileges. See Vernon Van Dyke, Human Rights, Ethnicity, and
Discrimination 174 (Greenwood, 1985) (discussing the example of South Africa).
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above the national average. The "difference" in treatment
amounts to preferential treatment. Furthermore, some
protections of minority identity clearly discriminate in favor of
the minority.43
In Europe, most Parliaments establish universities by grant-
ing the privilege to award university degrees generally only to
state institutions. The protection of a national minority's right to
special education, a subset of the right to preserve its national
language and identity, may further entitle minorities to establish
their own private universities without Parliamentary authoriza-
tion.
National minority rights that maintain and enrich the
group's identity represent positive discrimination against the
majority through the use of constitutionally protected human
rights. A strict scrutiny test should be applied to minority rights
because these rights are viewed as breaches of equality, although
generally only in the formal sense. The only inequalities that
should pass the test are those necessary to develop minority
identity. Also, such discrimination should not infringe upon the
constitutional rights of individuals not in the privileged minority.
This test is less burdensome than that of non-infringement of
majority rights, which can be easily interpreted as protection of
the state.
The problem of unequal distribution of financial and other
resources remains an open question, but no constitutional or
human rights principle exists which would guarantee equal dis-
tribution of resources. The granting of special subsidies remains
a matter of government discretion although, the State should not
discriminate among members within the same class of beneficia-
ries. To the extent minority identity is constitutionally protected,
distributional inequality in favor of the protected group(s) re-
mains acceptable, within limits. Unfortunately, these limits are
unclear, and where the existence of all groups depends on state
redistribution, it is politically difficult to accept minority protec-
tion.
On the other hand, entitlements are different from claims to
resources based on minority rights which appear to be unac-
' The law often prohibits political party financing by foreign citizens and even
governments, or at least requires that foreign financing be subject to special disclosure
rule. See, for example, the Hungarian Act XXXIII of 1989, Art 4 § 3, which states that a
party cannot accept money from a foreign state; The Law on Political Parties of Lithua-
nia, No. 1-606 Art 11 (Sep 25, 1990)(stating "political parties may not receive finances or
any other funds given by governmental institutions of other countries... ").
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ceptable as a constitutional principle, except under a federalist
formula. This is because entitlements are granted through a
parliamentary system which, as a constitutional principle and
practice, was created to limit the power to tax. Although taxation
in a parliamentary system depends on participation, it does not
include a right to special revenue distribution; consequently,
minorities have no right to a return of their tax contributions to
the members of their group. Even under a federalist formula,
such a right to "return" of contributions is limited." In this re-
spect, the nation-state is an outgrowth of the constant struggle
among pressure groups, including national minorities, to obtain a
privileged position in the revenue allocation game. To a large ex-
tent, the budget allocation is controlled by the executive branch.
However, this constitutionally granted privilege of the execu-
tive45 is shared with the Parliament, which is, by definition, ma-
jority rule and not sympathetic to national minorities. Economi-
cally depressed regions may receive preferential treatment under
the pretext of "national solidarity," but this is more often a result
of political considerations (for example, re-election concerns or
avoidance of disorder).46
Protecting members of a national minority does not require
special minority rights if one accepts the fundamental principles
of human rights and constitutionalism. However, infringement of
minorities' rights in the form of ethnic cleansing is frequently
carried out in the name of historical "rights" of specific groups.
Such infringement is also justified by claims of rendering histori-
cal justice by restricting rights of nationals of the "nation which
caused us suffering."
47
The real intellectual problem goes beyond simple non-dis-
crimination. The most common grievances and claims related to
identity include language use and special political protection of
the minority through special representation and autonomy. Au-
tonomy here refers to the process by which decisions on matters
4' German Const, Art 106.
"s Under most constitutions, the executive power shapes and presents the budget to
Parliament which then has only limited power to make changes. See, for example, French
Const of 1958, Art 39, 40, 47; German Const, Art 110, 113.
"' German Const, Art 107, § 2. This section states that Federal legislation shall
ensure a reasonable equalization between financially strong and financially weak
Laender.
41 See the Estonian citizenship case in Shlomo Avineri, The Issue of Citizenship in
Estonia (on file with the Archive of the Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe Project,
Budapest).
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affecting only a minority are made by that minority, or in a sys-
tem where the minority's political majority is guaranteed. How-
ever, given the state's dominance in Eastern Europe, these claims
compete with other claims of less contested rights, such as the
right of parental choice in education and equal franchise rights.
Certain rights require the State to provide services, including
health, justice, and education. The use of an official or the major-
ity language in the performance of those services creates an in-
equality of treatment and service for minority groups." To what
extent are public service recipients entitled to receive such servic-
es in their mother tongue, or in a manner which takes their reli-
gious or national identity into consideration? National minority
status should entitle minorities to the preferential allocation of
governmental services because they lack sufficient self-support
and identity development.49 However, entitlements based upon
weakness are not "rights" as minority rights advocates would
have us believe. They depend on the clemency of the strong and
cease as soon as the minority is in a better position.
48 Bruno De Witte discusses the problem in terms of "distribution of language com-
modities" in the Belgian context. Bruno De Witte, Le principe d'egalite et la pluralite
linguistique, in Henri Giordan, ed, Les minorities en Europe: Droits linguistiques et Droits
de l'Homme 55 (Editions Kime, 1992).
"' The interplay among nationalist government politics, nation-state building, and
electoral politics with respect to national minorities is evident in the case of "public
service electronic media." Although there is some privatization of mass media in Eastern
Europe, public television represents the single most important force of national cultural
homogenization in almost every post-socialist country. Cable networks, satellite and local
broadcasts may compete in terms of audience, but not in terms of political image forma-
tion. The news broadcasts are extremely limited and therefore few, if any, are broadcast
in a foreign language. National minorities constantly demand access to media and desire
their own stations. In a number of countries some of these demands are met by law
and/or practice. Nevertheless, the national minorities generally lack the financial re-
sources to own and operate independent systems. Thus, minority language broadcasting
often only exists as part of the national broadcast system. An independent minority lan-
guage broadcast would be financially viable only if the operators commercialized their
generally local broadcasts. This, however, would jeopardize their goal of maintaining their
national minority identity. Other forms of national culture share the same financial
difficulties, such as funding for local minority theater which is currently subsidized by the
state.
The State's reluctance to allow more minority independence in the realm of public
media should be interpreted in two contexts. First, television is the primary agent of
homogeneity and nation-state building. To the extent that nationalist mobilization is
needed, the political elite is forced to rely on television. Second, since public service
broadcasting is considered a means of protection against the "American dream factory"
and Music Television, it must be oriented to national culture. Nation-building and imperi-
al solidarity have been primary goals of public service broadcasting since the earliest days
of the BBC. See Thomas Gibbons, Regulating the Media 32-34 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1991).
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Another right which protects national minority identity is
the right to education in the national minority culture. Even if
identity protection generates specific minority protections, limited
resources and other group interests will severely restrict the
protection of national minority rights. Even if constitutionally
protected, national minority rights will nonetheless be weak
because they lack a corresponding state obligation to provide
specific minority services. On the other hand, such rights will be
strong enough to prevent the state from limiting those rights in
the private sphere.50
However, as long as the state may limit the private sphere,
minority self-protection will likewise be limited and will remain a
matter of fairness or political opportunity as opposed to constitu-
tionally protected rights. Genuine minority protection can be
developed only through enhancement of the private sphere. The
state will not interfere so long as protection of minority identity
only requires self-initiated action or "self-teaching" by the minori-
ties themselves. Unfortunately, this approach is unrealistic so
long as the state possesses monopoly control over services, and
retains a messianic view of its role in providing those services.
This is not a post-socialist phenomenon; in France, the constitu-
tional mandate of state education5' resulted in the denial of pri-
vate national minority education in Corsica and in Brittany.
However, unlimited reliance on minority decision-making in
minority-related matters may backfire, especially under post-
communist circumstances which distort national identities.
Minority leaders may claim that minority rights are properly
group and not individual rights and therefore the group as such
should make the decisions. However, this approach would take
decisions away from the community of concerned individuals,
those citizens who are directly affected by the decision. For exam-
ple, either the "National Gypsy Council" or perhaps a "European
Confederation of Romani" would decide whether gypsies in a giv-
en community should request separate but equal status in educa-
tion or city government, rather than the individuals themselves.
Notwithstanding the above difficulties, the theoretical solu-
tion lies in granting participatory rights to the minority in deci-
o The distinction between protective rights which do not allow the state to interfere
in the private sphere, and strong rights which require the state to act goes back to von
Wright. He speaks of "weak permission" as permission given through the lack of prohibi-
tion or regulation. George Henrik von Wright, Norm and Action 86 (Routledge, 1963).
51 French Const of 1946. Preamble.
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sions concerning its identity. National minority protection is a
problem of democracy in the sense that the answer depends upon
the extent to which the political structure allows direct participa-
tion and local decisions.
After decades of painful rearrangements, the Belgian consti-
tution was amended to grant special autonomies to the major
ethnic communities. The major language groups have veto power
in the Parliament, too. Belgium remained a unitary (non-federal)
state by constitutionally delegating many legislative powers to
the constitutive groups of Belgium. 2
The decentralist restructuring of Belgium is evidence that
under specific conditions, democracy within segregated communi-
ties adequately resolves the national minority protection ques-
tion. Minorities need democratic and participatory decision-mak-
ing powers in matters directly affecting them. A certain degree of
segregation is the inevitable price. But all this is easier said than
done; neither the etatistic tradition nor the nationalist majority's
short term interest will accommodate the "Belgian" approach,
particularly where the national minority is small and scat-
tered." Furthermore, concepts which were developed under con-
ditions of relative equilibrium are of little use in a culture which
lacks both fundamental democratic traditions and a history of
conflict management through negotiation and compromise.' The
supporter of a liberal-nationalist State may correctly fear that
the conferral of such decision-making authority to the minority
will create new forms of conflict and ultimately endanger the
democratic principle itself.
CONCLUSION
Nationalism is the only political force in Eastern Europe
powerful enough to combat the anomie left in the wake of com-
' See Maureen Covell, Ethnic Conflict, Representation and the State in Belgium in
Brass, Ethnic Groups and the State at 230, 252-54 (cited in note 33).
' Various constitutional arrangements use quotas to protect scattered national
groups. See, Van Dyke, Human Rights, Ethnicity, and Discrimination at 100, 124 (cited in
note 42) (referring to the provisions of the Fiji and Malaysian Constitutions).
For example, a numerical equilibrium exists in Kazakhstan and Estonia. It has
helped so far in the former case, but not in the latter. See Cynthia Kaplan, Estonia at
206-08 (cited in note 8); Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: A republic of minorities in
Bremmer and Taras, eds, Nations & Politics in the Soviet Successor States at 313, 327
(cited in note 8); Constitution Watch: Estonia, E Eur Const Rev 5 (Winter 1993). There is
no equilibrium in the post-Yugoslav states. Zeljko Ivankovic, /1 Faudra L'Inventer, E Eur
* Rptr 3, 4 (May-Jun 1992) (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia); "Third Yugoslavia," E Eur Rptr
11 (May-Jun 1992) (pie chart of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
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munism. The collapse of communism resulted in the dissolution
of the Soviet Empire and in the creation of more homogeneous
states. The processes of constitution-making are taking place as
part of nation-building. Therefore, nationalism has its modest
beginning in the region and constitutional analysis should take it
into consideration as more than a negative factor.
It may be that after initially excluding some people, the
nation-state will have a domesticating, civilizing effect on minori-
ty nationalism. For example, the political nations of the Baltic
States may incorporate their Russian ethnic minorities. Thus,
while the political nation is growing, the ethnic nation will be
deteriorating.55 The forging of a political nation not only in-
volves destruction of "alien" or minority identities but it also
destroys certain characteristics of the national majority identity.
The nation-state must resist official and popular xenophobia.
Otherwise, the state may lose its power to influence all spheres
of social life. If the state has control over the public sphere, there
may be a sufficient private sphere to encourage ethnicity and
tolerance. If the state has no constitutional obligation or right to
provide education, it will not be in a position to impose national-
ist curricula. Presently, there is little hope that the post-commu-
nist state will be significantly less pervasive than its predecessor;
however, current trends in financial and civil institutions,
churches, trade unions, and the press may change this pattern. If
the inevitable nationalistic tendencies are not carefully con-
trolled, they can destroy the very states and constitutions they
seek to construct. To strike the proper balance, the burning issue
is that national minority protection must be addressed to basic
democratic values, fairly and without compromise. Without ade-
quate minority protection, nationalism will not be successful in
its effort to build modem nations.
' Walker Connor, Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying? 24 World Politics 319, 322
(1972).
[1993:
